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ARGUMENT
The

core

issue

presented

in

this

case

is

whether

a

municipality must comply with its own ordinances. Draper City (the
"City") has enacted an ordinance which provides that an appeal from
a decision of the Planning Commission "shall be filed in writing
with the City Recorder within fourteen (14) days of the Planning
Commission's decision." (emphasis added)

The City argues that the

word "shall," as used in the ordinance, does not really mean shall,
but that it is merely a suggested time frame for taking an appeal.
As discussed fully below, Utah law quite correctly holds just the
opposite:

"Shall" means shall.

Accordingly, under Utah law, the

failure of a party to timely file an appeal in compliance with the
jurisdictional mandate is fatal to that party's right to appeal.
This jurisdictional issue is dispositive and the decision of the
district court should be reversed on this ground.
Even if the Court determines that the jurisdictional issue is
not dispositive, fundamental principles of administrative review
dictate reversal.

The City has enacted a Hillside Ordinance which

prohibits construction on slopes in excess of 3 0%.

The ordinance,

however, also permits an exception to that prohibition if certain
enumerated criteria are satisfied.
Council

completely

ignored

In this case, the Draper City

its own ordinance and reversed

Planning Commission's approval of the Owners' construction.

the
The

City Council based its decision on grounds other than those set

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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forth in the ordinance.

As such, the City Council's decision was

arbitrary and capricious.
The City's entire argument is based on the notion that the
Owners made material misrepresentations to the Planning Commission.
The Owners readily acknowledge that, based on incorrect information
received by the Owners, they stated their belief to the Planning
Commission

that

there

neighboring landowners.1
inaccurate.

was

no

opposition

to

the

project

from

That information later turned out to be

However, it is clear that the misrepresentation, to

the extent that there was any, was immaterial to the Planning
Commission's decision approving the project.

Accordingly,

the

City's argument, rather than providing a substantive legal basis
for decision, is little more than an inflammatory diversion.

The

district court erroneously upheld the decision of the City Council
and the Owners respectfully request that this Court reverse that
decision.
I.

THE CITY COUNCIL LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPEAL FROM THE
PLANNING COMMISSIONS APRIL 20, 1995 DECISION,
It is undisputed that the objecting parties failed to appeal

the Draper Planning Commission's April 20, 1995, decision within

x

The Owners simply had no knowledge of the purported
opposition. Indeed, the District Court expressly found that the
Owners' representation of their belief regarding the lack of
opposition was not knowingly false or made in bad faith.
brendl e \ repl -brf. hm
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fourteen

days,

as

required

by

City

acknowledges as much in its Brief.

Ordinance.2

The

City

The City, however, citing a

1957 New Hampshire case, argues that the 14-day appeal requirement
is advisory, not jurisdictional.3

While such may have been the law

in New Hampshire, it is not currently the law in Utah.

Indeed,

controlling authority from the Utah Supreme Court is dispositive.
In Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974), the
Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the word "shall," as used in
a county ordinance, was jurisdictional or advisory.

The ordinance

at issue in Herr provided:
The Board of County Commissioners, after proper review of the
decision of the Planning Commission, may affirm, reverse,
alter or remand for further review and consideration any

2

Appellee incorrectly cites Draper City Ordinance 9-6-050 as
controlling. Section 9-6-050 provides for appeal of certain issues
decided by the Planning Commission to the Draper City Board of
Adjustment.
The section also provides, however, that "certain
zoning matters including conditional use permits and subdivisions
shall be appealed to the City Council as designated by the City."
Id. Because the instant litigation involves an issue subject to
direct appeal to the City Council, Section 6-1-4 of the Draper City
Ordinances controls.
3

Aside from the plain inapplicability of New Hampshire case
law to this Court's decision, the case cited by Appellee does not
stand for the stated proposition.
Contrary to Appellee's
representation that "an objecting party could not be bound by a
lack of notice," Opp. Br. at 11, the court in Duma is upheld the
district court's finding that the complainant had complied with the
ten-day appeal requirement because he had registered his protest
with the clerk of the zoning board. Dumais v. Somersworth, 134
A. 2d 700, 702 (N.H. 1957) ("The building inspector was clerk of the
zoning board and the evidence warranted a finding that Barry made
his complaint within ten days of issuance of the permit.").
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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action taken by said Planning the Commission and shall make
such decision in seven (7) days of the hearing of the appeal.
Id.

at

729

(emphasis

in

original).

The

Board

of

County

Commissioners had taken eleven days to render its decision, rather
than the seven days set forth in the ordinance.

In holding that

the Board's delay resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, the Court
concluded that the use of the mandatory shall was jurisdictional,
not advisory:

"We think the County Commission should abide by its

own ordinance which says it shall make its decision within seven
days

after hearing,

and

if

jurisdiction in the matter."

it

fails

so to do, it

loses

its

Id. (emphasis in original). 4

The court in Herr cited the prior case of Lund v. Cottonwood
Meadows Co. , 392 P.2d 40 (1964) for the underlying rationale of its
decision.
park.

In Lund, a developer planned to construct a mobile home

A citizens' group opposed to the development

failed to

appeal the Planning Commission's approval of the project within the
ninety-day appeal period.5

The court reasoned that "[t]he 90-day

limitation of Sec. 17-27-16 is designed to assure speedy appeal to

4

The dissent noted that courts have drawn a distinction
between time limitations placed upon the parties, as opposed to the
tribunal. He rr, 525 P.2d at 729-30. Presumably, therefore, even
the dissent would have found a parties' failure to timely appeal a
decision as jurisdictional.
5

The ordinance provided that "An appeal of the Board of
Adjustments must be taken within ninety (90) days after the cause
arises or the appeal will not be considered by the Board of
Adjustments." Lund, 392 P.2d at 42 n.l.
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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the proper tribunal any grievance that a party may have who is
adversed by a decision of an administrative agency.

The evident

purpose of the statute is to assure the expeditious and orderly
development of a community."

Id. at 42.

In this case, Draper City Ordinance 6-1-4 is mandatory, not
advisory.

It provides that an appeal to the City Council "shall be

filed in writing with the City Recorder within fourteen (14) days
of the Planning Commission's decision."

The ordinance, like that

at issue in Lund, plainly furthers the goals of expeditious and
orderly development as well as finality.
argues, merely a recommendation.

It is not, as the City

It is jurisdictional.

The law in Utah is clear that the failure of a party to
challenge

the

action

of

an

administrative

body

within

the

prescribed time limit constitutes a waiver of that party's ability
to do so in the future.
concerns,

regardless

of

This is so regardless of the policy
the

equities.

On

this basis

alone,

reversal is required.
Moreover, even if consideration beyond the

jurisdictional

defect were appropriate, strong policy and equitable considerations
support such a conclusion in this case.

As the Appellee points

out, Draper currently is experiencing unprecedented growth.

It is

for that precise reason that parties must comply strictly with
ordinances
development.

brendle\repl~brf.hm

intended

to

facilitate

expeditious

and

orderly

Restricting the length of time that the status of a

5

project is in question certainly furthers that policy.

If parties

are permitted to challenge Planning Commission decisions outside of
the time frame set forth in the ordinance, the goals of orderly and
expeditious development will be defeated.
Failure

to

adhere

to

the

jurisdictional

bar

would

be

especially inequitable in this case. The Owners have expended well
in excess of $100,000 developing the property, based upon their
reasonable

belief

that

the

decision

rendered

by

the

Commission approving the development had become final.
disgruntled

landowners,

whose

standing

to

Planning
To permit

challenge

the

Commission's decision is tenuous at best, to thwart the development
at this late date is simply unfair.
II.

THE OWNERS1 RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT VESTED
COMMISSIONS DECISION BECAME FINAL.

ONCE

THE

PLANNING

As noted in Appellant's opening brief, the Owners obtained a
building permit and Planning Commission approval to construct on
the upper portion of lot 3 04.

As of May 4, 1996 (14 days following

the Planning Commission's decision), the Owners right to proceed
with

the

proposed

construction

vested.

The

City

dedicates

considerable argument to the notion that the Owners did not obtain
a

vested

right

Commission.

because

of

misrepresentation

the

Planning

That argument, and the cases cited in support thereof,

are factually misleading and legally incorrect.

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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In P.P. Corp. v. Lewis, 373 So. 2d 929 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979),
a case cited by the City, the Florida Court of Appeals upheld the
revocation of a building permit.

However, the basis for the

court's ruling was that the plans and specifications submitted for
the project had not been signed by the engineers who prepared them.
Instead,

the

plans

had

violation of state law.

been

signed

by

another

engineer,

in

Id. at 930.

In the present case, the Owners have at all times been quite
candid regarding their planned development of the property.

They

have recognized that the Hillside Ordinance would prohibit the
proposed construction and--initially as a condition to purchasing
the lot--they sought a variance.6

The "misrepresentation" that the

City refers to is not of the sort at issue in 0.P Corp.

There is

no

or

claim

of

specifications.

misrepresentation

of

the

project,

the

Rather, the City points to the representation the

Owners made to the Planning Commission that there was no longer any
opposition
owners.

to

the

construction

from

the

neighboring

property

This "misrepresentation," however, was neither material,

nor was it made in bad faith.

6

In fact, the Owners conditioned their purchase of the
property upon approval by the City and the City's issuance of a
building permit which the City later revoked.
The Owners would
never have purchased the property without the City's issuance of a
building permit.
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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The March 29, 1995 letter written by Mr. Brendle to the Draper
City Manager, seeking a new hearing on the proposal, does state
that there "is no opposition to the project."

As it turns out,

that statement was inaccurate because, unbeknownst to Mr. Brendle,
some

neighbors

did

oppose

the

planned

construction.7

Significantly, however, that was not the only basis upon which Mr.
Brendle sought review as the City would have the Court believe.

He

also stated that "the entire City Staff are in favor of he [sic]
new location, all believe it to be a more functional and improved
plan and that no harm will result.

The developer concurs with the

location at the top as better and less harmful."
There is nothing in the record establishing that the only
basis upon which the Planning Commission agreed to rehear the case
was the Owners' representation that there was no opposition to the
project.

Indeed,

the

fact

that

the

Planning

Commission

subsequently approved the Owners' proposal at the June 8 meeting-even with the knowledge of the neighbors' opposition--undercuts the
City's argument that the Commission's approval was founded upon
misinformation.
case

in

which

In short, the City's attempt to make this into a
approvals

were

obtained

through

material

misrepresentation is simply a transparent argument that this Court
should disregard.

7

The district court found, however, that the misrepresentation
was not made in bad faith.
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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In short, Western Land Equities v. Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah
1980) is controlling authority.

Under Western Lands, when the time

for appeal of the Planning Commission's decision ran--on May 4,
1995--Owners' right to proceed with their construction vested.
Accordingly, they may not be divested of that right without due
process of law.
III. DRAPER CITY SHOULD BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM HALTING OWNERS'
USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THEIR LAND.
In arguing that equitable estoppel is inapplicable in this
case the City relies solely upon the "misrepresentation" theory.
The City's attack on the Owners' argument of equitable estoppel
must,

therefore,

rise

or

fall

on

the

validity

of

its

misrepresentation theory. Again, however, the subsequent action of
the Planning Commission in approving the project after becoming
aware of the neighbors' opposition belies the City's conclusion.
The Planning Commission minutes of the June 8, 1995 meeting
reflect the basis for the Commission's decision.

Contrary to the

argument of the City, the commissioners were not swayed one way or
the other by the opposition of the neighbors. Commissioner Richins
stated that he changed his original vote against the project to a
vote in favor of the project because "the upper location was the
best location for the home."

Paul Glauser said from a technical

standpoint the top location is better, but that is not the only
consideration."

brendle\repl-brf.hm

Similarly, Commissioner Jones stated that "the

9

Planning Commission should not be dealing with the issue of views
but only with the suitability of building."
agreed

that

"the

Planning

Commission

Commissioner Howlett

cannot

guarantee views."

These sentiments do not reflect a view that the Commission had been
misled or that it never would have approved the construction had it
had the

"real"

facts in front of it.

To the contrary, these

statements reflect the view of a majority of the Commission that
the issue of the neighbors' concern, though marginally relevant,
was in no way controlling.

Accordingly, the fact that the Owners

initially incorrectly stated to the Commission that the neighbors
were not opposed to the construction is immaterial.

The Owners did

not, therefore, come before the court with unclean hands and the
doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply.

See Celebrity Club,

Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694-95

(Utah

1979) .
IV.

OWNERS
HAVE
BEEN DEPRIVED
OF
PROPERTY
WITHOUT
JUST
COMPENSATION
IN VIOLATION
OF THE
STATE AND
FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
Appellees argue that Owners' takings claims are premature

because

the

district

"Administrative Review."
review

of

a

final

court

has

not

yet

completed

This argument is specious.

agency

decision

administrative review process.

is

not

a

Judicial

part

of

the

See Utah Bankers Ass'n v. America

First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988, 993

(Utah 1996)."

takings issue was properly before the district court.

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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Thus, the

Citing a tort case, State v. Bellonio, 911 P. 2d 1294 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) , the City next argues that the Owners' takings claim is
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act because the Owners
failed to file a Notice of Claim.

Regardless of what the law may

be with respect to torts, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly
declined to rule on the applicability of the notice requirement of
the Governmental Immunities Act as applied to takings or damage to
property claims. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Co. , 797 P. 2d 419, 424
(Utah 1990) .

Thus, the fact that the Owners have not filed a

Notice of Claim with Draper City does not bar the instant action.
The City next argues the facts, claiming that the City's
action has not resulted in "complete destruction, confiscation, or
deprivation."

Opp. Br. at 21.

This argument not only misstates

the applicable standard, but it also misapprehends the issue.
In Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) ,
the Utah Supreme Court defined a "taking" as "any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owners right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
at 626.

Nothing

in the Court's definition requires

Id.

"complete

destruction" as the City claims.
The City's argument also misapprehends the real issue before
this court.

Without citing to record evidence, the City makes the

bold assertion that the interference in this case does not rise to

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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the level of a taking.

The City claims that " [t]he Lot in question

is still buildable in the lower portion, " and that "the Lot is
still capable of supporting a residence on the lower portion."
Appellees' Br. at 21 & n.3.

However, the court below made no

findings relative to the takings issue. The City's bald assertions
are insufficient

to uphold the district court's ruling.

At a

minimum, the case should be remanded for findings regarding the
takings issue.
V,

THE OWNERS7 CLAIMS THAT THE CITY ACTED IN AN ILLEGAL,
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER ARE NOT RES JUDICATA.
In Section VI of its opposition brief, the City states that

the district court determined the Owners' claims to be barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.

Nowhere in the district court's

ruling, however, is such a conclusion stated.

One can only surmise

that the City reads the court's factual finding taking judicial
notice of the prior proceeding before Judge Stirba as a statement
of res judicata.

Such a reading is unorthodox at best.

In any event, the doctrine of res judicata clearly does not
apply to the instant litigation.

The Owners have a separate cause

of action than that litigated in the previous case.

The Owners are

challenging the action of the Draper City Council taken on June 13,
1995.

The prior litigation involved the Council's August 23, 1994

decision.

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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New issues are presented in this litigation that were not
presented in the prior suit.

While the subject matter of the

litigation is related, that has never been the basis for holding a
suit barred on res judicata principles.

The fact remains that the

City Council action at issue here took place on June 13, 1995,
while the Council action challenged in the prior suit took place on
August 23, 1994.

The issue presented here--the Council's June 13,

1995 action--simply could not have been litigated previously.
such,

even

the

most

liberal

application

of

the

res

As

judicata

doctrine does not bar the Owners' claims.
VI.

THE COUNCILS REVERSAL OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S APPROVAL
WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND ILLEGAL.
The City of Draper has created a Planning Commission, the

powers of which include the " [p]reparation of a master plan as a
general guide for community growth and development."

Draper City

Ord. § 6-1-2 (A) . The City has enacted an ordinance which prohibits
construction on slopes greater than 30%.

However, the City also

has carved out an exception to that prohibition.

The Draper

Hillside Ordinance identifies three, and only three, criteria to be
applied when a party seeks to build on a slope in excess of 30%.
See Appellant's Br. at 31.

When an applicant seeks to build on a

slope in excess of 3 0%, it is the duty of the Planning Commission
in the first instance to review the application and determine
whether the criteria for deviating from the general rule have been

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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satisfied.

The decision of that body may be appealed to the City

Council if timely application is made.
In this case, the Planning Commission approved the Owners'
application to build on Lot 304.

Thus, a presumption arises that

the criteria set forth in the Hillside Ordinance for construction
on slopes greater than 30% were satisfied.
reversed

the

decision

of

the

Planning

The City Council then
Commission.

The

City

Council's reversal was arbitrary and capricious unless the decision
was based on a finding that:
(1)
(2)
(3)

the project would cause significant harm;
the proposed modification would not result in a more
functional and improved plan; or
the developer/builder
refused
to comply
with any
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning
Commission to mitigate the adverse effects which may
result from the proposed modification.

See Draper City Ordinance § 9-15-4(a)

[Ex. 7.]

As the City plainly admits in its Brief, the City Council's
reasoning for reversing the Planning Commission's ruling was not
based upon any of these

factors.

Instead,

it was based upon a

"desire to remain consistent with the stated policy of preventing
building on 30% slopes."
notes the City,

Appellee's Br. at 25.

Such a desire,

is "obviously rational and legally justified in

view of the City's remarkable growth and the potential for similar
requests in the future."
Owners

do not dispute

the City's

contention.

The goal of

consistency would be furthered by disallowing any construction on

brendle\repl-brf.hm
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slopes greater than 3 0%.8

Had the City of Draper elected to enact

such a strict ordinance without exception, the parties would not
presently be before the Court. However, the fact remains that City
of Draper has carved out an exception to the prohibition and it has
established guidelines for determining when construction on slopes
in

excess

of

guidelines,

30%

the

will

City

is

be

permitted.

bound

to

apply

Having
them

created
fairly

such

and

to

articulate the factual basis for its decisions disallowing such
development.

This is especially true where, as here, the body

empowered by ordinance to oversee planning and development has
already given its approval to a project.
It is important for this Court to recognize that the issue is
not whether the City Council's decision furthers its unwritten goal
of

"consistency" or whether the City seeks to avoid setting a

precedent.

The issue is whether, having established criteria for

evaluating applications to construct on slopes greater than 30%,
the City Council is then free to disregard that criteria, adopt new
criteria, and reverse the decision of the body it has empowered to
make such decisions, without so much as setting forth the factual
basis for its decision.

8

Owners also acknowledge that, as with any exception to a
rule, every time the exception is made, it further strengthens
precedent for future applicants.
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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A

reviewing

court

is

charged

with

ensuring

that

the

administrative agency, or, as in this case, the municipal body, has
considered relevant facts and applied the relevant criteria adopted
by the municipal body to those facts in a principled manner.

Cf.

Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5

(Utah

Ct. App. 1991) . Thus, it is of no consequence in the present case
whether the City's decision was "rational" or "legally justified."
It makes no difference whether the goals of the City in consistency
and to avoid precedent are worthy.

What matters is whether the

district court was able to review the City's action, based on the
record

before

it,

and

conclude

that

the

City

relevant factors and applied the stated criteria.

considered

the

The failure of

a trial court to make adequate findings is reversible error.

Acton

v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) . So too, the failure of
a municipal body to articulate facts in support of its decision
renders the decision arbitrary and capricious. See id.
case,

the

record

simply

does

not

support

the

City

In this
Council's

decision.
As the City notes in its brief, the City's action was not
premised upon a finding of "significant harm,"9 it was premised

9

As an afterthought, the City argues that the impact on
neighboring properties constitutes "significant harm."
Such a
finding appears nowhere in the City Council minutes, however. In
any event, there is no evidence in the record supporting such a
claim. There is no evidence which demonstrates why an impact on
neighboring views is significant, or what the cost is, or how that
brendle\repl-Jbrf.hm
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upon a desire for "consistency."
that

the

City

failed

Hillside Ordinance.

This admission alone demonstrates

to apply the criteria

set forth

in the

Accordingly, the district court's conclusion

that the City Council's decision was not arbitrary and capricious
should be reversed.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE FACT THAT OWNERS DID
NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH.
The City misapprehends the import of the authority cited in
Appellants' opening brief.

The Owners do not contend that the

absence of bad faith is dispositive.

Rather, the point is that the

trial court found specifically that the Owners did not act in bad
faith,

they

Commission.

did

not

consciously

try

to mislead

the

Planning

Thus, the mutual mistake recognized by the district

court was truly that--mutual.

As such, the doctrine of unclean

hands is inapplicable and the court should have gone on to consider
the issue of equitable estoppel.

The court's failure to do so was

an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Owners

respectfully request that

this Court REVERSE and, if appropriate, REMAND the case to the
district court.

impact may adversely affect future development. In short, there
simply is no factual basis supporting a "significant harm"
argument.
brendle\repl-brf.hm
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